Naming our concerns about neuroscience: a review of Bennett and Hacker's philosophical foundations of neuroscience.

Otrebski (2005) read a philosophy book and pulled out one big warning. The book says brain scientists often say 'the brain decides' or 'the brain remembers.' That is the mereological fallacy: giving a part what only the whole person can do. The paper lists the mistake and tells behavior analysts to keep language tied to what we can see.

The review finds no lab data. Instead it shows that fancy brain talk hides the real action. If you say 'his brain is impulsive,' you stop looking at the child's history and the room that shapes the acts. The paper says: stay with what organisms do in their worlds, not what brains supposedly do inside.

Barrett (2016) takes the same warning further. Where Otrebski (2005) says 'do not say the brain thinks,' Louise adds 'do not say the brain computes.' Both papers guard behavior analysis from computer-brain talk that sneaks mentalism back in.

Morris et al. (1982) beat the same drum earlier. That paper told readers to shun any cognitive middleman. Otrebski (2005) agrees but uses newer neuroscience examples to show why the rule still matters.

Martens et al. (1989) looks opposite at first glance. It cheers a merger of biology and behavior analysis. Otrebski (2005) does not reject biology; it only says brain facts must cash out as observable behavior. The two papers fit: use biology, but describe behavior first.

When you write reports or talk to parents, watch your verbs. Say 'the child requests,' not 'the brain wants attention.' This keeps treatment plans tied to environment changes you can control. Guarding your language guards your science and keeps the field honest.