Is a new version of philosophical pragmatism necessary? A reply to Barnes-Holmes.
Use classic pragmatist writings instead of coining "behavioral pragmatism."
01Research in Context
What this study did
Sam (2003) wrote a reply to Barnes-Holmes.
The paper asked: do we need a brand-new "behavioral pragmatism"?
Sam argued we should use the old, rich pragmatist texts instead of inventing fresh jargon.
What they found
The answer was no.
Existing philosophical pragmatism already gives behavior analysts the tools they need.
Creating a separate "behavioral" version would waste time and narrow our view.
How this fits with other research
Morris et al. (1982) gave the same warning earlier. They told us to keep cognitive terms out of behavior analysis. Sam repeats the lesson: borrow from philosophy, don’t rebuild it.
Fryling et al. (2022) show the advice in action. They tell ACT practitioners to tie every construct to an observable event. That move keeps philosophy practical, just as Sam wanted.
Contreras et al. (2024) reveal the problem Sam saw. A survey of ABA grad programs finds most teach only Skinner. Students rarely read James, Dewey, or Peirce. The narrow lens is exactly what Sam urged us to widen.
Why it matters
You don’t need a new label to sound scientific.
Next time you write a training plan, cite William James or John Dewey alongside Skinner.
Your supervisees will see that behavior analysis already sits inside a big, useful philosophy.
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02At a glance
03Original abstract
Barnes-Holmes (2000) discussed certain issues regarding philosophy, pragmatism, and behavior analysis, and offered a "behavioral pragmatism" based on or derived from behavior-analytic perspectives. In a comparison of certain philosophical views, Quine's concept of observation sentences was employed for representing pragmatism, but this concept is not sufficiently representative of the literature of philosophical pragmatism to warrant the broad conclusions drawn by Barnes-Holmes. Further, although the extensive and diverse literature of philosophical pragmatism has been shown by a number of writers to have various themes and perspectives in common with Skinner's radical behaviorism, it is unnecessary to extract a limited, generic version of pragmatism because (a) the latter cannot match the range and depth of the various extant versions and (b) the problems raised by Barnes-Holmes in justification for the new version yield readily to the current versions in philosophy. A set of philosophical views may provide additional verbal support for a given system of science, and the science of behavior analysis may eventually contribute to philosophical discourse. The latter, however, will not be achieved by proposing new versions of old philosophy, but rather by approaching established philosophical issues in new ways.
The Behavior analyst, 2003 · doi:10.1007/BF03392083