Comments on cognitive science in the experimental analysis of behavior.
Keep cognitive words out of your clinical talk; they hide the real environmental levers you can control.
01Research in Context
What this study did
Morris et al. (1982) wrote a position paper. They told behavior analysts to keep cognitive words out of their work.
The authors said words like "memory" or "attention" add no useful action. They said only environmental events should guide us.
What they found
The paper found no new data. It argued that cognitive science offers nothing testable.
Stay with observable environment-behavior links, they said. That route is clearer and more useful.
How this fits with other research
Barrett (2016) updates the same warning. She says "brain-as-computer" talk is just new paint on old mentalism.
Furrebøe et al. (2017) carry the idea to behavioral economics. They show how operant methods can replace stories about "irrational minds.
Martens et al. (1989) seems to soften the stance. That later paper urges teamwork with behavioral biologists, showing the field later opened to allied data while still keeping mental terms out.
Why it matters
When you write plans or train staff, skip mental words. Say "deliver praise right after the response" instead of "give feedback to build self-esteem.
This habit keeps treatment clear, measurable, and tied to things you can actually change.
Want CEUs on This Topic?
The ABA Clubhouse has 60+ free CEUs — live every Wednesday. Ethics, supervision & clinical topics.
Join Free →Replace one mental word in a client plan with its environmental description (e.g., change "attention-seeking" to "delivers peer eye-contact when he shouts").
02At a glance
03Original abstract
Arguments are increasingly being made for the inclusion of cognitive science in the experimental analysis of behavior (TEAB). These arguments are described, and a critical analysis of them is presented, especially in regards to the logic of objective inference and the renewed use of cognitive intervening variables. In addition, one particular defining feature of cognitive processes (i.e., the absence of an immediate controlling stimulus) is described, along with alternative points of view stressing molar-molecular levels of analysis and historical causation. Finally, comments are made on the use of cognitive concepts and language in the behavioral sciences. On all of these issues, counter-arguments are based on available material in behavior analysis metatheory, concepts, and experimental practices.
The Behavior analyst, 1982 · doi:10.1007/BF03392380