On the role of "memory" in the analysis of behavior.
Drop every mental middle-man—plot raw behavioral transitions and let the curve tell the history.
01Research in Context
What this study did
Branch (1977) wrote a think-piece, not an experiment. The paper asks: do we need the word "memory" to explain why behavior changes?
The author says no. Instead, watch how behavior moves from one state to another. Track visible transitions, not invisible storage bins in the head.
What they found
The paper finds that "memory" is extra baggage. We can describe the same data by plotting what the organism does next, given what just happened.
The call: build single-subject charts that show irreversible patterns. If behavior stays changed, the past is built into the new pattern—no memory label needed.
How this fits with other research
Nevin (1982) and Morris et al. (1982) pick up the same baton. They widen the fight from "memory" to all cognitive words. The rule stays the same: if a concept does not improve prediction or control, drop it.
Bachman et al. (1988) echo the method, not the topic. Both papers beg researchers to stick with single-subject designs. Branch (1977) wants them to study transitions; E et al. want them to rescue obesity treatment.
Frankot et al. (2024) seem to push back, but they don’t. They praise big-data tools yet still slice data to see each individual. Small-N charts and large pools can live side-by-side.
Why it matters
When you write a behavior plan, skip phrases like "he forgot" or "she remembered." Describe the trigger and the change. Graph one client at a time and look for lasting shifts in the curve. If the new level sticks, the history is already in the line—no extra box called memory required.
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02At a glance
03Original abstract
Shimp's (1976) recent paper on memory and the structure of behavior is discussed, as is the concept of memory itself. Radical behaviorism is distinguished from associationism, and behavioral accounts of experiments on short-term and long-term memory are provided. Unobservable theoretical quantities, such as rate of response, are distinguished from theoretical constructs such as memory. The logical inconsistency involved in the use of short-term memory as a "theoretical primitive" in the definition of units of behavior is explicated, and an alternative strategy for identifying units of behavior is presented. It is argued that the experimental analysis of behavior has ignored processes usually considered as memorial because many of the phenomena are irreversible. Methods for the study of transitions in single subjects should be developed more fully. Possible pitfalls associated with subscription to the term memory are listed, and it is concluded that the concept is neither required nor helpful in the analysis of behavior.
Journal of the experimental analysis of behavior, 1977 · doi:10.1901/jeab.1977.28-171