A Verbal Behavior Analysis of Theory of Mind: Conceptual and Applied Implications
Theory of Mind is teachable verbal behavior, not an innate skill.
01Research in Context
What this study did
Espinosa (2026) wrote a theory paper. He asked: What is Theory of Mind really made of?
He answered: It is not mind-reading. It is verbal behavior.
He then mapped out a teaching plan. The plan shows how to build these verbal skills step by step.
What they found
Theory of Mind is just a set of conditional discriminations.
Kids learn to say what they feel. Then they learn to say what others feel.
The paper gives the exact order of lessons. You start with simple "I feel" statements. You end with complex "She thinks I feel" statements.
How this fits with other research
Peters et al. (2018) warned that stand-alone ToM drills do not help real social skills. Espinosa (2026) agrees. His plan embeds each drill inside real social play.
Begeer et al. (2015) showed that short ToM lessons help kids pass tests, but gains do not spread. Espinosa (2026) explains why. Passing a test is just one verbal frame. His plan adds more frames until the skill travels.
Lancioni et al. (2000) proved that kids with autism need to describe play aloud before they can do it. Espinosa (2026) uses that same verbal step as the bridge into ToM.
Why it matters
You no longer need to guess if a child has "Theory of Mind." You can teach it like any other verbal skill. Use the paper's sequence. Start with the child's own feelings. Move to others' feelings. End with nested statements like "He thinks she wants." This turns abstract social goals into clear, teachable units.
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02At a glance
03Original abstract
Theory of Mind (ToM) is typically used as an umbrella term to refer to and interpret a collection of responses that involve humans’ ability to explain and predict others’ behavior based on an understanding of their mental states, such as beliefs and desires. Not only is the ToM construct widely accepted in psychology, but it has also come to represent a broader theoretical system invoked to explain a range of social and cognitive processes in both typical and autistic development, with false-belief tasks serving as its litmus test. This article offers a behavioral account of ToM as verbal behavior—in particular, that it involves the speaker–listener first tacting the environmental variables that are exerting control over another person’s behavior and then, engaging in conditional discriminations under multiple verbal control with respect to the difference between those variables and the ones influencing one’s own behavior. The article is organized into four sections: (1) an overview of ToM within mainstream psychology; (2) the requirements for a behavioral account and summary of current approaches; (3) an alternative analysis rooted in verbal behavior; and (4) a potential instructional sequence for establishing ToM-related repertoires in children for whom they are currently absent or incomplete. Contrary to claims that ToM may exist in nonverbal or implicit form, the present analysis argues that it is necessarily verbal—requiring speaker–listener behavior shaped by social reinforcement. It attempts to redefine ToM in functional terms—as verbal behavior (Skinner, 1957) shaped through differential contact with the contingencies governing one’s own and others’ actions.
Perspectives on Behavior Science, 2026 · doi:10.1007/s40614-025-00460-6