The California drought: A quasi-experimental analysis of social policy.

Handleman et al. (1980) watched water use during California’s 1976-77 drought. They compared towns that added fines for overuse with towns that used only voluntary pleas.

The team tracked monthly water bills for private homes and for businesses. No one was randomly assigned; the state set the rules.

Everyone used less water, even where no fines existed. Fines only trimmed use in the small share of homes that actually got a bill.

Stores, schools, and factories ignored the fines. Once drought news faded, savings vanished.

Winters et al. (2026) extend the same logic to HIV care. Cash payments doubled clinic visits, but visits crashed the month payments stopped. Both studies show that money works while it flows, then disappears.

Kohlenberg et al. (1976) found a near match with electricity. Feedback plus small cash cut peak use by half, yet use bounced back when the rebate ended. The two papers together warn that short-term money rarely builds long-term habits.

Davidson et al. (2025) seem to disagree. Their review says contingency management beats the odds, giving bigger drug-abstinence gains than the dollar value predicts. The gap is context: clinic-based cocaine programs layer strong social praise on top of the cash, while drought and energy studies relied on money alone.

If you run token economies, pair any fine or reward with social praise, feedback, or peer cues. Plan a fade-out, not a cliff. For example, shrink the bonus slowly while adding public charts and verbal cheers so the skill stays when the money leaves.