The functional analysis of psychological terms: The symmetry problem.
Use everyday mental words only when they map one-to-one onto contingencies you can manipulate.
01Research in Context
What this study did
Leigland (2002) wrote a theory paper. He asked: why do we talk about wants, beliefs, and feelings in ABA?
He said these words are useful only when they point straight to the environmental contingencies we can change.
What they found
The paper found no new data. Instead it argued that ‘symmetry’ between words and contingencies keeps us honest.
If a term does not guide you to a variable you can act on, drop it.
How this fits with other research
Jessel et al. (2020) show that functional analyses still vary wildly across clinics. Sam’s stance helps: use terms that match the exact contingency you test.
Glenn (1988) stretched contingencies to whole cultures. Sam pulls the lens back to single clients, showing symmetry works at every scale.
Michael (1978) warned that fights in ABA are really theory-vs-tech spats. Sam answers: link every concept to a tech move and the fight fades.
Why it matters
Next time a teacher says, “He acts out because he wants attention,” ask: what contingency delivers that attention? Then test, don’t guess. Sam gives you the wording to stay concrete and the license to ditch fluffy mental terms that stall treatment.
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02At a glance
03Original abstract
Skinner (1945) proposed an empirical research program in which subjective, mentalistic, or psychological terms from ordinary language could be analyzed in terms of the contingencies that control their occurrence. The practical successes of such a program, however, may face an unusual challenge. The symmetrical relation between the terms and the controlling contingencies may be construed by critics as support for the "intentional criticism," a frequent criticism of radical behaviorism by philosophers in which intentional concepts are said to "underlie" or are "presupposed" or are otherwise foundational to the technical vocabulary of behavior analysis. These critics thus promote intentional explanations as more fundamental and of more general importance than behavior-analytic explanations of human behavior. A pragmatic counterargument is described in which the vocabulary of controlling contingencies enables uniquely effective behavior with respect to the phenomena that control the occurrence of the psychological term, unlike additional ordinary-language terms that might also be evoked by the term.
The Analysis of verbal behavior, 2002 · doi:10.1007/BF03392973