Mentalism, behavior-behavior relations, and a behavior-analytic view of the purposes of science.
Keep explanations in your reports tied to observable events, not invisible minds.
01Research in Context
What this study did
Lord et al. (1986) wrote a theory paper, not an experiment.
They asked, "What is science for?" and answered, "To predict and control events."
The authors warned that words like "mind" or "self-reinforcement" sneak mentalism back into our field.
What they found
The paper found no new data.
It found a risk: when we say "the child self-reinforced," we sound scientific but still explain behavior with more behavior.
The authors urge us to treat those phrases only as shorthand for environmental events we can see and change.
How this fits with other research
McDowell (2013) extends the same warning. That paper says methodological behaviorism today hides mentalism inside computer-style mediators.
Hobson (1984) seems to contradict C et al. It welcomes cognitive theories, while C et al. rejects them. The gap is real: one wants purity, the other pluralism.
Bowe et al. (1983) turns the warning into action. It tells teams to build small groups that reward behavioral talk, a practical shield against mentalistic drift.
Why it matters
When you write a plan, scan for mental filler words. Swap "He has poor motivation" for "No reinforcer followed the response." Your treatment becomes clearer, and you stay true to the science C et al. defends.
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02At a glance
03Original abstract
In a behavioral view, the purposes of science are primarily prediction and control. To the extent that a scientist embraces both of these as a unified and generally applicable criterion for science, certain philosophical and theoretical practices are counterproductive, including mentalism in both its metaphysical and metatheoretical forms. It is possible and often worthwhile to recast some mentalistic talk into an issue of behavior-behavior relations. When behavior-behavior relations are approached non-mechanistically, however, analysis cannot stop at the level of the relations themselves. Several analytic concepts common in the behavioral community share some of the dangers of mentalism if not employed properly, including such concepts as self-reinforcement, response-produced stimulation, and self-rules.
The Behavior analyst, 1986 · doi:10.1007/BF03391944