Relations among functional systems in behavior analysis.

Thompson (2007) traced Skinner’s ideas about cause and effect back to the 1700s.

The paper shows how David Hume’s view of causality flows straight into Skinner’s radical behaviorism.

No new data were collected; the article is a close philosophical reading.

Skinner’s rejection of hidden causes mirrors Hume’s earlier attack on mental powers.

Both men treat cause-and-effect as regular patterns we observe, not secret forces.

The lineage gives behavior analysts a clear, non-mystical way to talk about why behavior happens.

Hackenberg (1995) already linked Skinner to biologist Jacques Loeb’s push for prediction and control.

Travis adds Hume, so the family tree now has two branches: one pragmatic, one philosophical.

Imam (2001) pins Skinner’s turn to selectionism on Darwin and Peirce; Travis pushes the timeline further back, showing Hume set the stage for all later selectionist talk.

Together the papers sketch a steady line from Hume → Darwin/Peirce → Skinner, with no breaks or contradictions.

When you say “the environment caused the response,” you are speaking Hume’s language.

Knowing this history keeps you consistent: no hidden minds, no mystery causes, just observable relations.

Next time a team member slips into mentalistic talk, you can cite the Hume-Skinner link to steer the discussion back to environmental causes.