Radical behaviorism and the subjective-objective distinction.

Michael (1995) wrote a theory paper. He asked one question: Is the difference between 'I feel sad' and 'He looks sad' a difference in worlds or just in who can see it?

He used radical behaviorism to answer. He said both statements are behavior. One is public, one is private. Same stuff, different locks on the door.

The paper found no ghost in the machine. 'Subjective' is simply behavior with limited access. Your toothache is covert; your grimace is overt. Both are events, not realms.

So the old wall between 'inner' and 'outer' melts. We keep the wall only as a practical note: some behavior is harder for others to measure.

Parker (1984) already showed that Skinner's three-term contingency and Kantor's interbehavioral field fit together. Michael (1995) takes that marriage and applies it to privacy, giving the same lens to toothaches and talking.

Roche et al. (2003) later shook hands with social constructionists. They agreed both camps reject little homunculi in the head. J's (1995) idea that privacy is just access level gives the behaviorist side of that handshake.

Malagodi (1986) urged radical behaviorists to study whole cultures. J's (1995) move helps that project by letting us treat a community's hidden rules (say, unspoken norms) as private behavior we can eventually make public through observation.

When a client says 'I just feel off,' you no longer need to choose between honoring their experience and staying scientific. Treat the statement as data that is hard, not impossible, to verify. Ask for collateral reports, watch facial cues, or shape clearer self-descriptions. The paper gives you permission to stay behavioral without dismissing private events—and that keeps your treatment human and consistent at the same time.