Children with Autism Spectrum Disorder's Lying is Correlated with Their Working Memory But Not Theory of Mind.

The team gave children a temptation task. If kids peeked at a toy they were told not to touch, they had a chance to lie.

The sample included children with autism, children with intellectual disability, and typically developing peers.

Each child also took a working-memory game and a theory-of-mind test. The goal was to see which skill lined up with lying.

Children with autism lied less often than both other groups.

Lying frequency went hand in hand with working-memory scores, not with theory-of-mind scores.

Even kids with strong theory-of-mind skills did not lie more if their working memory was weak.

Keintz et al. (2011) first showed that autistic kids can lie but struggle to keep the story straight. Weina et al. now add that the number of lies links to working memory, not false-belief understanding.

Mazza et al. (2017) found that theory-of-mind deficits explain broader social-processing problems in autism. That looks like a clash, but the outcomes differ: Monica studied everyday social skills; Weina studied the single act of lying. Theory of mind helps with social rules, yet it does not help a child invent a quick cover story.

Eussen et al. (2016) also pinned discourse problems in autism on working-memory overload, not theory of mind. The new paper extends the same idea to deception: if memory space is tight, the lie never gets off the ground.

Stop assuming that a child who understands false beliefs will automatically lie. Check working-memory span instead. When you need a truthful report from an autistic client, reduce memory load: ask one question at a time, offer cues, or allow extra think time. If you are running social-skills groups, pair perspective-taking drills with memory games; both skills are needed but they do not grow together.