Theory of mind in Williams syndrome assessed using a nonverbal task.
Silent false-belief tasks reveal a real but uneven theory-of-mind gap in Williams syndrome.
01Research in Context
What this study did
The team gave a silent false-belief task to people with Williams syndrome.
No talking was allowed, so language skill could not hide the result.
They wanted to see if these learners truly lack theory-of-mind.
What they found
Most of the Williams group failed the silent task.
Only a small subgroup passed, showing the deficit is real but uneven.
Strong language had been masking the problem in earlier verbal tests.
How this fits with other research
Serrano-Juárez et al. (2021) extends this finding. They show kids who keep the GTF2I gene do better on theory-of-mind tasks. The 2008 deficit now looks partly genetic.
Ching-Zhang et al. (2022) finds a similar negative pattern. Children with Williams syndrome also lag in naming emotions from stories. Together the papers map a wide social-cognition gap.
Lacroix et al. (2009) adds a twist. Their Williams group scored even lower than age-matched children with autism on reading emotional faces. The theory-of-mind deficit is part of a broader social-perception problem.
Why it matters
Use picture or puppet false-belief tasks before you write “good social skills” in the report. Expect some learners to pass and others to fail; plan individual lessons, not syndrome-wide goals.
Want CEUs on This Topic?
The ABA Clubhouse has 60+ free CEUs — live every Wednesday. Ethics, supervision & clinical topics.
Join Free →Try a one-page picture strip false-belief probe first; note who passes before you teach perspective-taking.
02At a glance
03Original abstract
This study examined Theory of Mind in Williams syndrome (WS) and in normal chronological age-matched and mental age-matched control groups, using a picture sequencing task. This task assesses understanding of pretence, intention and false belief, while controlling for social-script knowledge and physical cause-and-effect reasoning. The task was selected because it is entirely non-verbal, so that the WS individuals could not rely on their good verbal skills when performing the task. Results indicated a specific deficit in understanding of false belief within the WS group. There was also evidence of heterogeneity in the WS group, with the false belief impairment restricted to only a particular subgroup of WS individuals identified originally by Porter, M., & Coltheart, M. (2005). Cognitive heterogeneity in Williams syndrome. Developmental Neuropsychology, 27(2), 275-306.
Journal of autism and developmental disorders, 2008 · doi:10.1007/s10803-007-0447-4