Teleological Properties of Operant Behavior
Goal talk is allowed in ABA if you immediately tie it to the client's history of reinforcement.
01Research in Context
What this study did
Lazzeri et al. (2025) wrote a theory paper. They asked: can we use goal words like "in order to" in behavior analysis without sounding mentalistic?
They built a new rule. If you tie every purpose phrase back to selection by consequences, the talk stays scientific.
What they found
The authors found no new data. They found a wording fix. You can say "the rat presses the lever to get food" if you mean "pressing has been selected by past food delivery."
The trick is keeping the history of consequences in the same sentence or paragraph. Then the goal talk is shorthand, not a ghost in the machine.
How this fits with other research
Staats (1994) said the opposite. That paper warned that any teleological phrase misleads readers because it sounds like inner purpose. Lazzeri et al. answer: the danger disappears if you anchor the phrase to the animal's history of reinforcement.
Rachlin (2013) and Simon (2023) warmed the ground. They explained teleological behaviorism with stories and interviews. Lazzeri et al. take the next step and give a clear rule for safe wording.
Okouchi (1999) reviewed earlier philosophy that already linked mental terms to extended behavioral patterns. The new paper fits that line but adds the explicit "selection by consequences" guardrail.
Why it matters
If you supervise RBTs or write plans, you can now relax a little. You may say "Tanisha completes her math sheet to earn her iPad" as long as you remind staff that this phrase is backed by her reinforcement history. The article gives you a one-line test: can you state the consequence history right after the goal word? If yes, the sentence passes. Use it in notes, parent meetings, and staff training without sounding unscientific.
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Add one clause after every purpose phrase in your session note: state the reinforcer that maintained the behavior.
02At a glance
03Original abstract
In this article we investigate the teleological properties (functions and goals) of behavioral patterns, with emphasis on operant behaviors, including those associated with creativity and behavioral novelty. We integrate the etiological theory of teleology (as developed by Larry Wright, Ruth G. Millikan, James Garson, and others) with key concepts from behavior analysis. Although the language of functions and goals has traditionally faced resistance within behavior analysis, mainly due to concerns about causal confusion, we argue that such language is conceptually valuable when situated within the framework of selection by consequences. In the first part of the article, we disentangle teleological discourse from common misconceptions, particularly worries about reverse causation and the obstruction of causal explanation, drawing on insights from Larry Wright and others. In doing so, we set out what teleological concepts do not imply, while also identifying their core semantic features, such as the contrast between functions or purposes and mere accidents. In the second part, we develop an etiological interpretation of the teleological properties of behavioral patterns which, besides harmonious with the semantic core of teleological concepts, has theoretical synergies with behavior-analytic understanding of operant behavior, thus avoiding mentalistic aspects of some previous etiological readings of complex action. Our approach integrates Skinner’s interpretation of selection processes with recent advancements in behavior analysis, including theories of operant generativity, behavioral variability, and relational frames. Finally, we conclude by setting our approach in contrast with two influential theories of teleology, in a way that brings into view its potential advantages.
Perspectives on Behavior Science, 2025 · doi:10.1007/s40614-025-00481-1