Suboptimal choice in a percentage-reinforcement procedure: effects of signal condition and terminal-link length.

Cohen et al. (1990) worked with pigeons in a two-key chamber.

Each key led to a different terminal link. One key gave food every time. The other gave food only half the time.

The team added a twist. Sometimes a light came on and told the bird a long wait was coming. They varied how long the wait was and whether the signal appeared.

Most birds picked the sure-thing key when waits were short or silent.

When the wait was long and the light signaled it, preference flipped. Many birds now chose the risky side even though it paid less.

The signal turned a good deal into a bad one.

Nevin et al. (2016) later saw the same signal power in children. Lean signaled DRA cut problem behavior and also cut relapse. Both studies show a signal can override normal payoff rules.

Barrett et al. (1987) found that unsignaled delays hurt responding. L et al. added a signal and got the opposite: the signal made the delay costlier, so birds walked away. The two papers bracket how timing and information interact.

Malone (1975) showed pigeons like stimuli that tell them what is coming. L et al. show that if the news is "long wait," the birds stop liking it. Preference for information flips when the information is bad.

Your client may "choose" a lean schedule if the rich one comes with clear but aversive signals. Think of a token board that always announces a 5-minute wait before the big reinforcer. The learner might leave or act out even though the payoff is better. Try fading the signal, shortening the delay, or adding signals to both schedules so no side feels worse.