Magnitudes of score differences produced within sessions in a cooperative exchange procedure.
People actively keep earnings equal unless a penalty or end cue pushes them apart.
01Research in Context
What this study did
Adults sat across from each other in a lab. They pressed buttons to earn coins for both themselves and the partner.
A computer showed each person's score after every press. The session ended when a timer hit zero.
The researchers added rules: sometimes a small fee punished making the scores unequal. Other times a warning light said the game would end soon.
What they found
Without the fee, people kept the two scores almost equal. Minute-by-minute adjustments kept the gap tiny.
When the fee arrived, one player quickly pulled ahead. The gap stayed large for the rest of the session.
A final warning light brought the scores back to equal again. People rushed to even things out before time ran out.
How this fits with other research
Weiner (1977) looks opposite at first. In that study, people pressed a button that helped only the partner. That kind of 'pure altruism' faded fast. The difference is the task: keeping scores equal feels fair and stays strong, while one-way helping is fragile.
Clarke (1998) moves the same idea into competition. Proportional payoffs plus live feedback kept both players trying hard. Fixed winner-take-all prizes made the loser quit early. Together the papers show that payoff rules, not just social motives, shape whether people keep or break equality.
Mace et al. (1990) took the insight to a classroom. Students shifted their math work toward the side that paid more tokens. The lab lesson—reinforcement rate drives allocation—held true for kids and academic tasks.
Why it matters
You can build or break cooperation in any session by how you set the payoffs. If you want two learners to stay equal, avoid penalties that reward one for pulling ahead. If you need a quick reset, add a clear 'session almost over' cue and watch them balance the scores. Control the contingencies and you control the fairness.
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02At a glance
03Original abstract
Interest centered on maximal score differences produced within sessions during two-party exchange. Subjects chose between earning money independently or through potentially higher-paying exchange. In the exchange option, only one person could produce points for the other on a trial. Because each exchange response ("give") required the giver to forego earning points independently, the larger the score difference produced (i.e., the further ahead in earnings the other person was put), the greater the reduction in the giver's earnings if the other person did not reciprocate. Results showed that scores were usually equal at the end of each session, and that subjects maintained close equality of scores throughout each session. When a response-cost contingency that punished the alternation of giving was introduced, however, large within-session score differences developed. These large differences continued to be produced after the response-cost contingency was removed. Finally, when subjects were told that the session could end at any moment, score differences were sharply reduced, indicating that production of score differences remained under the control of discriminative stimuli associated with the likelihood of reciprocation. The study suggests that with appropriate procedures, an experimental analysis of behavioral phenomena associated with the concept of "trust" may be possible.
Journal of the experimental analysis of behavior, 1977 · doi:10.1901/jeab.1977.27-331