How to Do Things With Texts: A Functional Account of Reading Comprehension
Treat reading comprehension as observable text-use, not as an inner mental picture.
01Research in Context
What this study did
Flores et al. (2020) wrote a theory paper. They asked, 'What is reading comprehension, really?'
Instead of looking inside the head, they looked at what readers DO with texts. They used legal briefs and short stories as examples.
What they found
The paper does not give data. It gives a new lens. Reading comprehension is the reader’s socially-shaped, text-based ACTION.
If the reader can use the text to win a case or tell a joke, comprehension happened. No hidden mental movie is needed.
How this fits with other research
Sorenson Duncan et al. (2021) meta-analyzed 26 studies on kids with autism. They found word reading and oral language matter equally. Flores shrinks both factors: only what the child DOES with the text counts.
Hong et al. (2021) taught first-graders with autism to retell stories. Retell quality went up. Flores cheers: retelling is a public, social act—perfect evidence of comprehension.
Stern et al. (2013) showed that double-spaced screens help only if attention is strong. Flores flips the spotlight: stop fixing the text; study the payoff the reader gets after reading.
Why it matters
Next time you probe comprehension, pick tasks that matter to the learner—filling out a job form, ordering pizza, winning a debate. Pick data you can see: correct action, not correct ‘understanding.’ This keeps assessment fair, clear, and tied to real life.
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Join Free →Add one ‘text-use’ probe to your session—ask the learner to act on what they read (circle the bus schedule time they need, text the answer to a friend, etc.) and score success by the outcome.
02At a glance
03Original abstract
AbstractWe offer an account of reading comprehension that we believe will help clarify some common conceptual confusions in the relevant literature, as well as contribute to existing functional accounts. We argue that defining texts qua texts as stimulus classes, on the one hand, and equating “comprehension” with behavior (covert or otherwise), on the other, are not useful conceptual moves, especially when behavioral settings go beyond basic literacy skills acquisition. We then analyze the structure of the contingencies that usually evoke talk of “comprehension” using techniques from analytic philosophy. We show how keeping the results of this analysis in mind can help avoid the conceptual bafflement that often arises, even among behavior analysts, when defining or assessing behavioral phenomena related to reading comprehension. Using two contrasting cases (legal texts and stories), we argue that what counts as comprehension depends, not peripherally but crucially, on the shared social practices of which texts are a part. Finally, we propose a new framework for classifying reader–text contingencies by combining two dimensions: openness of setting and embeddedness of reinforcement.
The Analysis of Verbal Behavior, 2020 · doi:10.1007/s40616-020-00135-0