Effects of consequences of advice on patterns of rule control and rule choice.
People catch overblown promises faster than small lies, yet may still follow the bad rule if the real payoff feels fuzzy.
01Research in Context
What this study did
The team asked college students to pick one of two rules before a computer game.
Each rule promised points: some told the truth, some overstated, some understated the real payoff.
The students played, earned points, then later picked a rule again.
What they found
Students spotted the rule that wildly over-promised points more often than the one that quietly under-promised.
Yet, even after spotting the lie, they still sometimes picked the inaccurate rule on the next round.
Bigger lies made it harder to tell which rule was right.
How this fits with other research
Iwata et al. (1990) saw the same pattern with preschoolers: a spoken plan only guides behavior if reinforcement follows the plan.
Both studies show that the consequence, not the words, locks the rule in place.
Mueller et al. (2000) added that signaling the upcoming cost (travel time) sharpens adult choice, just like signaling true point gains sharpens rule choice here.
Together the three papers say: give clear, honest feedback right away if you want the rule to stick.
Why it matters
When you give a client a rule—"Do this, earn that"—make the payoff match your words.
Over-promising may get quick compliance, but the learner will notice and may drop the rule later.
State the contingency exactly, then deliver it.
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02At a glance
03Original abstract
Rules in the form of advice can inaccurately state the effects of recommended responses by overstating or understating size of the consequences. Three experiments investigated the effects of such inaccuracies on patterns of rule control and rule choice with female college students. In Experiment 1, signaled accurate, overstated, or understated rules specified that a given number of points would be earned by pressing a designated key. For some subjects, rules specified a number of points to be gained; for other subjects, rules specified a number of points to be lost from an amount given earlier. Point totals stated in the inaccurate rules averaged 25% more (overstated) or 25% less (understated) than those received. When subjects could choose either the response specified in the rule or an alternative response that produced an unpredictable number of points, they showed greater sensitivity to the inaccuracy of overstated rules than understated rules. In trials at the end of the experiment in which subjects could choose which rule to see, subjects did not always choose accurate rules and often chose inaccurate rules for which they had shown less sensitivity earlier. Experiment 2 replicated this pattern in which subjects could choose which type of rule to see on a greater number of trials. Some evidence suggested that subjects prefer an improvement from the outcomes promised to those later received. In Experiment 3, rules misstated by averages of 25% and 50% were compared. Evidence suggested that increasing the size of the misstatement reduced the discrimination of inaccurate rules from accurate ones.
Journal of the experimental analysis of behavior, 1998 · doi:10.1901/jeab.1998.70-1