Behavioral pragmatism: no place for reality and truth.
Truth in ABA is what produces useful behavior change, not what matches an invisible reality.
01Research in Context
What this study did
Kraijer (2000) wrote a theory paper. It asked: what if truth is just what the scientist finds useful?
The paper says we do not need to check if our ideas match some outside reality. We only need to see if the ideas help us reach our goals.
What they found
The author calls this view behavioral pragmatism. Truth is judged by the scientist’s own behavior, not by a picture of the world.
If a rule or story helps the scientist predict or control events, then it is true enough.
How this fits with other research
Kelly et al. (1970) showed that posture feedback only works when the person wants to sit straight. The behavior, not the words, decides the outcome. This fits the pragmatist idea.
Cooper et al. (1990) found that key pressing followed the real reinforcement schedule, not the reinforced verbal rule. Again, behavior over words.
Malott (1988) picked room timeout because it stopped escapes with less fuss. The choice was made by practical effect, not by matching some hidden truth.
Why it matters
You can stop hunting for the one perfect theory. Pick the explanation that gets your client moving. If a visual schedule cuts tantrums, it is true for that child. Test, measure, and keep what works. Leave the deep reality debate for the philosophers.
Want CEUs on This Topic?
The ABA Clubhouse has 60+ free CEUs — live every Wednesday. Ethics, supervision & clinical topics.
Join Free →Pick one procedure you use and list the client outcomes that prove it works for you.
02At a glance
03Original abstract
The current article begins by reviewing L. J. Hayes's claim that pragmatism relies on a correspondence-based truth criterion. To evaluate her claim, the concept of the observation sentence, proposed by the pragmatist philosopher W. V. Quine, is examined. The observation sentence appears to remove the issue of correspondence from Quine's pragmatist philosophy. Nevertheless, the issue of correspondence reemerges, as the problem of homology, when Quine appeals to agreement between or among observation sentences as the basis for truth. Quine also argues, however, that the problem of homology (i.e., correspondence) should be ignored on pragmatic grounds. Because the problem is simply ignored, but not resolved, there appears to be some substance to Hayes's claim that pragmatism relies ultimately on correspondence as a truth criterion. Behavioral pragmatism is then introduced to circumvent both Hayes's claim and Quine's implicit appeal to correspondence. Behavioral pragmatism avoids correspondence by appealing to the personal goals (i.e., the behavior) of the scientist or philosopher as the basis for establishing truth. One consequence of this approach, however, is that science and philosophy are robbed of any final or absolute objectives and thus may not be a satisfactory solution to philosophers. On balance, behavioral pragmatism avoids any appeal to correspondence-based truth, and thus it cannot be criticized for generating the same philosophical problems that have come to be associated with this truth criterion.
The Behavior analyst, 2000 · doi:10.1007/BF03392010