Varieties of scientific explanation.
Treat every explanation you give as a bit of verbal behavior shaped by its past payoff, not as a formal law.
01Research in Context
What this study did
Embregts (2000) compares three ways scientists explain things. The paper shows how Skinner’s radical behaviorism uses a different style than the two classic models.
It is a theory piece, not an experiment. No clients, no data sheets—just clear maps of how explanations work.
What they found
Radical behaviorist explanations are practical stories about how words gain power. They are not tidy "if A then B" laws.
Instead, they track how speaker and listener react to past consequences. The goal is workable prediction, not perfect proof.
How this fits with other research
Schoenfeld (1995) set the stage. That paper defended Skinner’s view of language after Chomsky’s attack. Embregts (2000) widens the lens and shows the same verbal-behavior logic works for any scientific explanation.
McGrother et al. (1996) give live data. Their study proves that a reprimand can reinforce destructive behavior. This real-world case shows the pragmatic style J describes: look at what the words do, not what they "mean."
Murdock et al. (1977) used single-case design to shape clearer speech. Their focus on verbal topography pairs with J’s call to treat "explanation" as shaped verbal action.
Why it matters
When you write reports, ditch the urge to sound like a physics textbook. State what behavior occurred, what consequence followed, and how that history predicts future talk. Your readers—parents, teachers, payers—grasp stories faster than laws. Use plain words tied to observable events and your recommendations will travel further.
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02At a glance
03Original abstract
Scientific explanations often take one of two forms. The first is instantiation. According to this form, an event is said to be explained when it can be expressed as some particular value of a variable in a general proposition, equation, or law. One example of instantiation in psychology is Stevens' psychophysical law. Another is the matching law in the experimental analysis of behavior. A second form of explanation is a deduction from a covering law. According to this form, an event is said to be explained when its description follows as a valid logical deduction in an argument that has a covering law as one premise and a statement of antecedent conditions as another premise. Examples of covering law explanations in psychology are found in traditional neobehaviorism, which sought to develop laws of behavior so that observed behavioral events could be explained as deductions therefrom. Strictly speaking, neither form of explanation is consistent with behavior-analytic explanations derived from Skinner's radical behaviorism, which emphasize the pragmatic sources and contributions of the verbal behavior regarded as explanatory.
The Behavior analyst, 2000 · doi:10.1007/BF03392009