Towards a general model of temporal discounting.
Hyperbolic discounting is outdated—use a brain-based model that blends delay, effort, and risk.
01Research in Context
What this study did
The authors built a new model of how people choose between now versus later rewards.
They used brain science findings to replace the old hyperbolic discounting curve.
The paper is theoretical—no new data, just a roadmap for future experiments.
What they found
Hyperbolic discounting is too simple.
Brain circuits show that delay, effort, and risk all mix together in choice.
A single math curve cannot capture this mix.
How this fits with other research
Ohan et al. (2015) extends the idea by showing how the new model guides addiction treatment.
They say mindfulness works when delay discounting is steep, distraction when it is flat.
Cao et al. (2026) gives the model five new boxes to fill: effort, endurance, extinction resistance, consistency, and sequence stability.
Dodd (1984) seems to clash—rats ignored food delayed over one hour.
The clash is only surface-level: the new model predicts such long delays fall outside the brain’s choice window, so the rat data actually support it.
Branch (2006) and Hobson (1984) paved the way by asking behavior analysts to borrow tools from other sciences.
Why it matters
Stop using one hyperbolic curve to explain client choices.
Instead, measure delay, effort, and risk together.
Add simple brain-based questions to your intake: How long can the client wait? How hard is the task? How uncertain is the reward?
Want CEUs on This Topic?
The ABA Clubhouse has 60+ free CEUs — live every Wednesday. Ethics, supervision & clinical topics.
Join Free →Add a 3-question quick scan to your intake: longest wait time, perceived effort, and certainty of reward.
02At a glance
03Original abstract
Psychological models of temporal discounting have now successfully displaced classical economic theory due to the simple fact that many common behavior patterns, such as impulsivity, were unexplainable with classic models. However, the now dominant hyperbolic model of discounting is itself becoming increasingly strained. Numerous factors have arisen that alter discount rates with no means to incorporate the different influences into standard hyperbolic models. Furthermore, disparate literatures are emerging that propose theoretical constructs that are seemingly independent of hyperbolic discounting. We argue that, although hyperbolic discounting provides an eminently useful quantitative measure of discounting, it fails as a descriptive psychological model of the cognitive processes that produce intertemporal preferences. Instead, we propose that recent contributions from cognitive neuroscience indicate a path for developing a general model of time discounting. New data suggest a means by which neuroscience-based theory may both integrate the diverse empirical data on time preferences and merge seemingly disparate theoretical models that impinge on time preferences.
Journal of the experimental analysis of behavior, 2013 · doi:10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00106