Psychological linguistics: A natural science approach to the study of language interactions.

Logue et al. (1986) lay out Kantor’s natural-science view of language. They treat talking and listening as behavior–behavior relations, not as mind-to-mind messages.

The paper is pure theory. It gives no new data, but it shows how future studies could test everyday talk as environmental events only.

The authors find that mental words like "think" or "mean" can be replaced with observable speaker and listener responses. Language interactions become just one behavior causing another behavior.

They sketch research paths: track how a question changes a listener’s next reply, or how a story alters later reading speed.

Julià (1982) warned that mixing linguistics with behaviorism is risky. W et al. answer by showing Kantor’s framework keeps the two separate: structure stays in linguistics, function stays in behavior analysis.

Parker (1984) says Kantor’s field model and Skinner’s three-term contingency are allies. W et al. extend that alliance to talking itself, mapping speaker and listener into the same field.

Lord et al. (1986), published the same year, also reject mentalism but focus on self-reinforcement. Both papers agree: stay in the environment, never inside the skin.

Critchfield (1996) later revives Skinner’s 1945 plan to test mentalistic terms. W et al. supply the linguistic half of that program by turning "meaning" into observable exchanges.

When a client says "I feel anxious," you can stay scientific. Treat the words as verbal behavior that evokes your reassurance, not as a hidden feeling. Design interventions that change the verbal chain—prompt calmer statements, reinforce slower speech, or alter audience cues. Kantor’s lens keeps you from slipping back into mind-talk while still honoring what people say.