Suing for Peace in the War Against Mentalism
The anti-mentalism war is over—behavior analysts can now use mental words when they clarify function.
01Research in Context
What this study did
Burgos et al. (2019) wrote a theory paper. They looked at the long fight against mentalism in ABA. The authors checked the three classic arguments used to ban mental words. They asked if the war still helps the field.
The paper is not a study with kids or data. It is a map of past battles and a call for peace talks.
What they found
The war against mentalism has failed. The old arguments do not hold up. Behavior analysts still use mental words in private. The field should stop the ban and start talking with mental concepts instead of yelling at them.
How this fits with other research
Hayes (1991) said the same thing 28 years earlier. That paper warned ABA had lost its philosophical voice by only talking tech. Burgos et al. pick up the same torch, showing the gap never closed.
Wolfensberger (2011) also waged peace, but in the disability-language war. Both papers say purity rules hurt real work. They urge natural, useful words over strict codes.
Travers et al. (2025) defend ABA against outside critics. Their plea fits Burgos: stop fighting inside battles so the field can face the public together. The 2019 call for truce sets the stage for the 2025 defense.
Why it matters
You still avoid words like "wants" or "thinks" in reports. This paper says that habit may shrink your toolbox. Try adding one plain mental word if it helps the team grasp the function. Example: "Task avoidance may reflect the learner’s expectation of failure." Keep the behavior tech, but let the language breathe.
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02At a glance
03Original abstract
The antimentalists’ war against mentalism has not vanquished it. To examine why, we focus on two theses—mind as causal and internal—and three standard attacks against mentalism as defined by both theses: 1) mentalism implies dualism; 2) mind is unobservable, which hinders its scientific study; and 3) mentalism is impractical. These salients fail because: 1) if the mind is causal and internal, it must be material; 2) the observable/unobservable distinction is too problematic, with antimentalists equivocal about where to draw that line, with some even embracing publicly unobservable behavior as causally relevant; and 3) mentalism has not been demonstrated to be less practical than antimentalism. For the war on mentalism to succeed, stronger attacks must be devised, both scientific and philosophical. We contemplate some possibilities, while expressing doubts as to the wisdom of continuing the war. Peace may be better than war, and the resulting intellectual commerce may be good for both sides.
Perspectives on Behavior Science, 2019 · doi:10.1007/s40614-018-0169-2